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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Beginning with Basu and Van (1998), the past decade has witnessed a proliferation 
of the literature on child labor.1
 
In their path breaking contribution, Basu and Van 
(1998) present a fundamental framework of child labor with two important axioms: the 
luxury axiom and the substitution axiom. Basu and Van (1998, p. 416) define the luxury 
axiom as “a family will send the children to the labor market only if the family’s income 
from non-child-labor sources drops very low,” and the substitution axiom as “from a 
firm’s point of view, child labor and adult labor are substitutes.”  
A number of empirical studies, however, reveal some puzzles. For example, Hunt 
(1973, 1986) and Nardinelli (1990) find that in Britain in the nineteenth century, despite 
 
* I am grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments and suggestions. 
1 For example, see the surveys by Cigno and Rosati (2005) and Edmonds (2008). Indeed, child labor has 
long been an important social and economic phenomenon. For example, back in 1861, 36.9 percent of boys 
and 20.5 percent of girls in the 10-14 age group in England and Wales were laborers (Basu, 1999). Child 
labor is still prevalent in many developing countries of the present time (Basu, 1999). It is reported that many 
children in rural India and Brazil begin to contribute to farm work at the age of five or six and are sizable 
contributors by age twelve (Becker, 1991). 
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the large regional variations in wages, there is no correlation between the general wages 
of adult males and children’s labor market participation rates. Bhalotra and Heady 
(2003) show that in rural Pakistan and Ghana in the 1990s, the children of land-rich 
households are often more likely to work than those of land-poor households. As their 
finding appears to be in contradiction with the luxury axiom, Bhalotra and Heady (2003) 
name it “the wealth paradox”. Moreover, similar empirical findings to “the wealth 
paradox” are obtained in other developing countries (Kambhampati and Rajan, 2006; 
Dumas, 2007; and Kruger, 2007). 
This paper attempts to develop a simple model that sheds light on “the wealth 
paradox”. We incorporate four crucial ingredients, child leisure, child labor, education, 
and a household’s subsistence constraints, in a unified framework. Indeed, while all of 
these ingredients are identified as being essential to the understanding of child labor in 
the literature, to our best knowledge, no attempt has been made to consider them in the 
same framework. For example, Basu and Van (1998) abstract from the consideration of 
children’s education. Much subsequent literature (e.g., Baland and Robinson, 2000; 
Ranjan, 2001; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002; Fan, 2004a, 2004b; Doepke and Zilibotti, 
2005) examine the relationship between child labor and human capital. However, 
somewhat surprisingly, none of the literature has considered child leisure in relation to 
the luxury axiom of Basu and Van (1998). Thus, the current paper attempts to help fill 
this gap.  
The analysis of this paper implies that when adults’ wage rate is low so that a typical 
household’s faces a subsistence constraint in consumption, parents’ income is the key 
determinant of child labor. In this case, the luxury axiom holds strictly and children’s 
working time decreases as parents’ income rises. On the other hand, when adults’ wage 
rate is relatively high so that the subsistence constraint is not binding, the substitutability 
between child labor and adult labor may become the major determinant of child labor. In 
fact, under some circumstances, the analysis implies that the relative productivity of 
child labor, namely the substitutability between child labor and adult labor, may matter 
much more than parents’ absolute income to children’s labor market participation.  
Thus, the analysis of this paper provides an explanation for “the wealth paradox” in 
light of the luxury axiom and the substitution axiom. For example, although the 
Industrial Revolution greatly increased the average wage rates of adult workers in 
Britain, the rates of children’s labor market participation were much higher when the 
Industrial Revolution began than prior to the Industrial Revolution (e.g., Deane and Cole, 
1967). A number of economic historians explain this phenomenon as that the Industrial 
Revolution greatly increases the substitutability between child labor and adult labor (e.g., 
Nardinelli, 1990; Lavalette, 1998; Tuttle, 1999). In particular, based on her extensive 
empirical research, Tuttle (1999, pp.75-76) concludes that,  
 
“It was demand, not supply, which dramatically increased the employment of 
children and youths in certain leading industries during the British Industrial 
Revolution .... The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain had an impact on the demand 
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for child labor because several new inventions in the textile industry and innovations in 
the production process of making cloth and extracting coal increased the productivity of 
children and youths. As children and youths became more productive, the demand for 
their services rose.” 
 
Indeed, in both historical and contemporary times, much evidence shows that the rise 
of the substitutability between child labor and adult labor is a major or even the most 
important cause of child labor.2
 
Thus, this paper complements the existing literature 
toward a better understanding of the historical and contemporary phenomena of child 
labor.3 
Also, this paper shows that the Luxury Axiom and the Substitution Axiom of Basu 
and Van (1998) are intrinsically linked. In particular, we show that if the degree of 
substitution between child labor and adult labor is below a certain threshold level, child 
labor exists only if adults’s wage rate is low so that the subsistence constraint is binding. 
Namely, the Luxury Axiom of Basu and Van (1998) holds if and only if their 
Substitution Axiom holds weakly. Moreover, it shows that the greater is parents’ taste 
for children’s leisure or the greater is a child’s rate of return from devoting more time to 
study in the accumulation of human capital, the less likely will parents send children to 
work. However, a greater rate of return from investing more financial resources on 
children’s education may increase parents’ incentive to send children to work since child 
labor increases household income and hence more financial resources on the child’s 
education. 
 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
Our basic analytical framework builds on Basu and Van (1998), Fan (2004a), and 
other existing literature, with the following extensions: (1) parents care about both 
children’s leisure and their human capital,4 (2) a child’s human capital formation 
depends on both money input and her time input.  
We assume that every individual lives for two periods: childhood and adulthood (i.e., 
parenthood). Each family has one parent and one child, and the parent is the only 
 
2 For example, see Hunt (1973), Nardinelli (1990), Lavalette (1998), and Tuttle (1999) for historical 
evidence and see Levy (1985), Bonnet (1993), Mehra-Kerpelman (1996), and Nangia (1987) for the evidence 
in developing countries of modern times. 
3 For example, see Basu and Van (1998), Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (2001), Hazan and 
Berdugo (2002), Fan (2004a, 2004b), and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005). 
4 The basic setup of the paper is similar to Fan (2004a), and some of the results of the paper (e.g., 
Proposition 1) are similar to Fan (2004a). But Fan (2004a) does not consider children’s leisure in a 
household’s utility function. Thus, this paper extends Fan (2004a).  
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decision maker of a household. A parent cares about the family’s consumption, her 
child’s human capital, and her child’s leisure. Formally, a parent’s (i.e., an adult’s) 
utility function takes the following form 
 
lhcV   )ln()ln( ,                                              (1) 
 
where c, h, and l denote the household consumption, the child’s human capital, and the 
child’s leisure, respectively.   and   are positive parameters that measure the extent 
to which parents are altruistic. Note that the utility function implies that relative to a 
household’s material consumption and a child’s human capital, a child’s leisure is a 
“luxury good” for the parent. So, the formulation of the utility function is consistent with 
the “Luxury Axiom” of Basu and Van (1998).  
Every child is endowed with one unit of time, which divided into three parts: (1) 
time for work, e, (2) time for study, s, (3) time for leisure, l. So, we have  
 
1 lse .                                                       (2) 
 
A child’s human capital is determined by the financial resources on her education (x) 
as well as her time of study. Specifically, as in Fan (2004a), we assume that a child’s 
human capital production function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form. 
 
 sxh  ,                                                         (3) 
 
where  , and   are both positive coefficients. Then, we can rewrite (1) as, 
 
lsxclhcV   )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( .                   (4) 
 
We now turn our attention to the demand of labor and the determination of the wage 
rates. We assume that individuals operate in a small open economy in a one-good world. 
The production function is,  
 
L
KkkLfLKFY  ),(),( ,                                        (5) 
 
where Y, K, and L are total output, the quantity of capital and the quantity of labor 
respectively. Since the economy is perfectively competitive, the interest rate of physical 
capital, r, and the wage rate of skilled labor, w, are determined as follows, 
 
)()(),( kfkkfwkfr  .                                         (6) 
 
Suppose that the world interest rate is constant at r . Assuming that the small 
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economy permits unrestricted international lending and borrowing, its interest rate must 
also be equal to r . Therefore, the ratio between capital and skilled labor in this 
economy is constant at a level krf  )(1 . Thus, the wage rate, w, is constant at the 
level of 
 
)()( kfkkf  . 
 
We assume that every adult is endowed with one unit of labor and that every child is 
endowed with   unit of labor ( 0 ). Then, an adult’s income and a child’s wage rate 
are w and w  respectively. Clearly,   measures the substitutability between child 
labor and adult labor (or the relative productivity of child labor). First, as shown by Basu 
and Van (1998),   is determined by the relative productivity between child labor and 
adult labor in a competitive labor market. So, as discussed previously, “  ” will be the 
crucial parameter in this model. Second,   can also be affected by the implementation 
of the laws that punish or ban child labor. If child workers are the ones who would be 
fined if being caught, their expected earnings will clearly decrease. If the fines are on 
employers, they would have to pay an extra cost (either the possible fines or the cost of 
bribing policemen) when they employ children. This extra cost will at least partially pass 
on to the child workers. Thus, in both cases, from the perspective of parents and children, 
these laws will reduce the returns to child labor. And, the more strictly these laws are 
enforced, the smaller “  ” will become. 
We assume that a household cannot borrow in the capital market. Also, for 
simplicity, this paper abstracts from the consideration of bequest from parents to 
children.5 Then, an adult’s budget constraint is  
 
wewxc  .                                                    (7) 
 
Plugging (2) into (7), we can rearrange (7) as 
 
wwwlwsxc   .                                           (8) 
 
Finally, we consider that a household faces a subsistence constraint, whose simplest 
form can be described as  
 
c ,                                                            (9) 
 
where   is the minimum level of consumption for the subsistence of both the parent 
and the child of a household.  
 
5 Baland and Robinson (2000) present an analysis that considers both child labor and bequest. 
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First, we consider the intuition in which the subsistence constraint, (9), is not binding. 
In this case, a parent maximizes her utility “V ” subject to (8). Then, the Langragian can 
be written as  
 
)()ln()ln()ln( wlwsxcwwlsxcL   . 
 
So, the first order conditions are  
 
01 
 
cc
L ,                                                   (10) 
 
0
 
xx
L ,                                                  (11) 
 
0
 w
ss
L  ,                                                (12) 
 
0
 w
l
L  , (with strict equality holds if 0l ).                     (13) 
 
Then, we have the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: When the subsistence constraint is not binding, we have the following 
results.  
 
(1) If   , then 
 
Condition Result 

  1  
0,0  le  



 11  
0,0  le  

  1  
0,0  le  
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(2) If   , then 
 
Condition Result 

  1  
0,0  le  



 11  
0,0  le  

  1  
0,0  le  
 
Proof. See Appendix. ￭ 
 
Lemma 1 implies that when the subsistence constraint is not binding, a key 
determinant of a child’s working time and leisure time is the relative productivity of 
child labor,  . As child labor productivity rises, a child tends to work more and enjoys 
less leisure.  
Next, the following lemma characterizes the conditions for that the subsistence 
constraint is and is not binding.  
 
Lemma 2: 
 
(1) If 
  1 , the subsistence constraint is binding if and only if 
 
 
w . 
 
(2) If 
  1 , the subsistence constraint is binding if and only if 
 

 

1
1w . 
 
(3) The subsistence constraint is not binding if 
 



 
 



1
1,maxw . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. ￭ 
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If the subsistence constraint is binding, then c . In this case, the Langragian can 
be written as  
 
)()ln()ln(ln wlwsxcwwlsxL   . 
 
So, the first order conditions are 
 
0
 
xx
L ,                                                  (14) 
 
0
 w
ss
L  ,                                                (15) 
 
0
 w
l
L  , (with strict equality holds if 0l ).                    (16) 
 
Then, we have the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1:  
 
(1) When the subsistence constraint is binding, child labor decreases as her parent’s 
income increases if it exists, that is,  
 
0
dw
de . 
 
(2) When w , child labor always exists and 
 
0d
de . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. ￭ 
 
Proposition 1 discusses the determinants of child labor when the subsistence 
constraint is binding. In this case, because people are very poor, child labor is mainly 
caused by the subsistence need of a household. So, a child’s working time tends to 
increase as her parent’s income decreases. Meanwhile, if the substitutability between 
child labor and adult labor,  , rises, a child needs to work less to meet her family’s 
subsistence level of consumption. Consequently, in this case, as   increases, a child’s 
working time tends to decrease. 
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Proposition 2: When 


 
 



1
1,maxw  such that the subsistence 
constraint is not binding, we have the following results: 
 
(1) Child labor exists if and only if 
 

  1
),min( . 
 
(2) Suppose that child labor exists, then, a child’s working time will increase if the 
relative productivity of child labor,  , rises. 
(3) A child’s working time is independent of her parents’ income, that is, 
0
dw
de . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. ￭ 
 
Firstly, child labor will exist if and only if the relative productivity of child labor is 
above a certain threshold level; secondly, when child labor exists, children’s labor 
market participation increases as child labor productivity rises. Thus, the first two parts 
of Proposition 2 complements the existing literature in explaining the empirical 
observations that a major determinant of child labor is the substitutability between child 
labor and adult labor.  
The third part of Proposition 1 is a somewhat surprising result. Its intuition is as 
follows. On one hand, as an adult’s wage rate, “w”, rises, household wealth will increase 
and the “income effect” will increase children’s study time and reduce their time of 
working. On the other hand, holding “  ” constant, a child’s wage rate, “ w ”, will 
increase as “w” rises. So, a child’s opportunity cost of study increases and the 
“substitution effect” increases child labor. In this model, the “substitution effect” and the 
“income effect” exactly offset each other, which implies that a child’s working time is 
independent of her parents’ income. Thus, when the subsistence constraint is not binding, 
this model illustrates that under reasonable conditions, child labor may not mainly be 
determined by parents’ income when holding   constant.  
Proposition 2 implies that the substitutability between child labor and adult labor,  , 
is a major determinant of child labor. Further, when the income of a typical household is 
beyond the subsistence level, Proposition 2 implies that the relative productivity of child 
labor, namely the substitutability between child labor and adult labor, may matter much 
more than adults’ absolute wage rate to children’s labor market participation. Thus, our 
theoretical analysis sheds light on “the wealth paradox” and other empirical findings 
discussed in the introduction. For example, it provides an explanation for economic 
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historians’ findings that in Britain in the nineteenth century, parents’ wages have no 
impacts on children’s labor market participation. Also, note that land and labor are 
complementary in agricultural production, which implies that an increase in land raises 
the wage rates for both child labor and adult labor (e.g., Bar and Basu, 2009; Basu et al., 
2010). Meanwhile, an increase in family land may raise the relative wage of child labor 
due to the imperfection of labor market (e.g., Dumas, 2007), which from Proposition 2 
implies we know that it will increase children’s labor market participation. Thus, this 
proposition helps us understand “the wealth paradox” revealed by Bhalotra and Heady 
(2003) and other empirical studies discussed in the introduction.  
An implicit assumption of this paper is that when people are poor, children’s 
education may be partially funded by child labor. While to my knowledge there is no 
such a direct empirical test of this assumption, there is some indirect empirical evidence 
that appears to support it. For example, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) show that in 
contemporary world, many people still live under one U.S. dollar per day (at purchasing 
power parity), and they spend little on their children’s education. In this case, children’s 
earnings would clearly help finance children’s education, such as buying textbooks and 
some basic educational materials. Also, a child’s human capital clearly includes her 
health. Some empirical studies (e.g., Horrell et al., 2001; and Park, 2010) show that a 
household’s wealth was a very important factor that determines children’s health. 
Moreover, Weil (2007) and Venkataramani et al. (2010) show that health is an important 
determinant of economic growth and production efficiency. 
Next, this analysis aims to better understand the interactions between the Luxury 
Axiom and the Substitution Axiom of Basu and Van (1998). These two axioms, which 
serve as the foundation of Basu and Van (1998) and contribute greatly to the recent 
expansion of the economic literature on child labor, are stated as follows.  
 
The LuxuryAxiom: A family will send the children to the labor market only if the 
family’s income from non-child-labor sources drops very low.  
The Substitution Axiom: From a firm’s point of view, child labor and adult labor are 
substitutes.  
 
Clearly, the relative productivity of child labor,  , measures the degree of substitution 
between child labor and adult labor. Meanwhile, the following corollary shows that the 
Luxury Axiom and the Substitution Axiom of Basu and Van (1998) are intrinsically 
linked.  
 
Corollary 1: 
If, 
 

  1
),min( ,                                                   (17) 
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child labor exists only if adults’ wage rate is low so that the subsistence constraint is 
binding. Namely, if (17) is satisfied, the Luxury Axiom of Basu and Van (1998) holds.  
 
Proof. See Appendix. ￭ 
 
This corollary indicates that if the degree of the substitution between child labor and 
adult labor is below a certain threshold level, child labor is purely a phenomenon of 
poverty. Thus, the analysis implies that there is a close relationship between the two 
axioms of Basu and Van (1998). Namely, the Luxury Axiom of Basu and Van (1998) 
holds if and only if their Substitution Axiom holds weakly.  
Also, we can see that the threshold level increases with   and  , but decreases 
with  . The intuitions are as follows. First, as   increases, the child’s rate of return 
from devoting more time to study in the accumulation of human capital increases, which 
tends to reduce parents’ incentive in sending children to work. Second,   is an 
indicator of parents’ taste for children’s leisure. Thus, when   increases, parents are 
less likely to send children to work. Third, when   increases, the rate of return from 
investing more financial resources on the child’s education increases. Since child labor 
increases household income, which lead to more financial resources on the child’s 
education, an increase in   may induce parents to send children to work.6 
Moreover, from Corollary 1, we can see that even if parents have strong preference 
for children’s leisure, child labor may still exist. In relation to the model specification, a 
strong preference for children’s leisure is interpreted as   being large. When   is 
sufficiently large, we will have  ),min( . Then, if the relative productivity of 
child labor,  , is large enough, we will have   , which implies that child labor 
exists in this case. With reference to Basu and Van (1998), our analysis implies that the 
Luxury Axiom holds only when the substitution between child labor and adult labor is 
sufficiently weak. 
 
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 
In their path breaking contribution, Basu and Van (1998) present a fundamental 
framework of child labor with two important axioms: the luxury axiom and the 
 
6 In a poor economy, a household’s wealth is often essential for children’s schooling. As pointed out by 
Ranjan (2001), children in poor countries often face credit constraints in their schooling. So, in a sense, the 
increase in child labor productivity and child labor increases the wealth of a poor household and consequently 
reduces the problem of credit constraint. For example, as household income increases, parents may buy more 
textbooks and other essential study equipment for the children, which is of great help to children’s human 
capital formation particularly in a poor economy. 
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substitution axiom. A number of empirical studies, however, reveal a “wealth paradox”, 
which seems to contradict the luxury axiom. The current paper has two aims. First, it 
helps explain the “wealth paradox”. Second, it attempts to better understand the 
relationship between the luxury axiom and the substitution axiom.  
It develops a simple model of child labor by incorporating four crucial ingredients, 
child leisure, child labor, education, and a household’s subsistence constraints, in a 
unified framework. The analysis of this paper implies that when adults’ wage rate is low 
so that a typical household’s faces a subsistence constraint in consumption, parents’ 
income is the key determinant of child labor. In this case, the luxury axiom strictly holds 
and children’s working time decreases as parents’ income rises. On the other hand, when 
adults’ wage rate is relatively high so that the subsistence constraint is not binding, the 
substitutability between child labor and adult labor may matter much more than parents’ 
income to children’s labor market participation. Thus, this analysis provides an 
explanation for “the wealth paradox” in light of the luxury axiom and the substitution 
axiom.  
Also, this paper shows that the Luxury Axiom and the Substitution Axiom of Basu 
and Van (1998) are intrinsically linked. In particular, we show that if the degree of 
substitution between child labor and adult labor is below a certain threshold level, child 
labor exists only if adults’ wage rate is low so that the subsistence constraint is binding. 
Namely, the Luxury Axiom of Basu and Van (1998) holds if and only if their Substitution 
Axiom holds weakly. Moreover, it shows that the greater is parents’ taste for children’s 
leisure or the greater is a child’s rate of return from devoting more time to study in the 
accumulation of human capital, the less likely will parents send children to work. 
However, a greater rate of return from investing more financial resources on children’s 
education may increase parents’ incentive to send children to work since child labor 
increases household income and hence more financial resources on the child’s education.  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we try to solve a parent’s optimization problem when the 
subsistence constraint is not binding. The analysis is divided into 2 cases.  
 
Case 1: (13) holds with strict equality  
 
In this case, from (10) and (13), we get  
 

wc  .                                                          (A1) 
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From (11) and (13), we get 
 

wx  .                                                       (A2) 
 
From (12) and (13), we get 
 

s .                                                         (A3) 
 
Then, plugging (A1), (A2) and (A3) into (8), we get 
 




 wwwwwwsxcwwwl  . 
 
So, 
 



 111l .                                            (A4) 
 
Thus, from (2), we have 
 

 111  lse .                                           (A5) 
 
Case 2: (13) holds with strict inequality  
 
In this case, from (13), we have 0l . 
Then, from (10), (11), (12), and (8), we can get 
 




1
wwc ,                                                  (A6) 
 
)1(
)(



 wwx .                                                (A7) 
 
And  
 
)1(
)1(



s .                                               (A8) 
C.SIMON FAN 38
So, when 0l , we have 
 
)1(
1 


 lse .                                        (A9) 
 
Now, we check under conditions, (13) holds with strict equality (i.e., 0l ). Note 
that from (A4), 0l  if and only if  
 
0111  

 , 
 
namely 
 

  1 .                                              (A10) 
 
Meanwhile, in this case, from (A5), 0e  if and only if  
 
011  
 , 
 
namely  
 

  1 .                                                     (A11) 
 
Also, note that if   , then 
 




 11 . 
 
So, if   , 
 
Condition Result 

  1  
0,0  le  



 11  
0,0  le  

  1  
0,0  le  
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Next, we consider the case that (13) holds with strict inequality. From above, we 
know 0l  implies 
 

  1 .                                              (A12) 
 
Meanwhile, when (13) holds with strict inequality, from (A9), 0e  if and only if 
 
0
)1(



 , 
 
namely  
 

  1 .                                                     (A13) 
 
Also, note that if   , then  
 






 111 . 
 
So, if   ,  
 
Condition Result 

  1  
0,0  le  



 11  
0,0  le  

  1  
0,0  le  
￭ 
 
Proof of Lemma2: Suppose that *c  is the optimal solution without the 
subsistence constraint. Then, If the subsistence constraint is binding if and only if 
*c .  
 
(1) If 
  1 , from (A1), the subsistence constraint is binding if and 
only if 
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 
wc* , 
 
namely  
 
 
w . 
 
(2) If 
  1 , from (A6), the subsistence constraint is binding if and 
only if 
 

 

1
* wwc , 
 
namely  
 

 

1
1w . 
 
(3) It’s obvious from (1) & (2). ￭ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the analysis is divided 
into 2 cases. 
 
Case 1: (16) holds with strict equality  
 
In this case, from (14), and (16), we get  
 

wx  .                                                      (A14) 
 
From (15) and (16), we get 
 

s .                                                        (A15) 
 
Then, plugging (A14), and (A15), into (6), we get 
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

 wwwwwsxcwwwl  . 
 
So, 
 
w
l 


 11 .                                         (A16) 
 
Thus, from (2), we have 
 

 11 
w
lse .                                        (A17) 
 
Clearly, 
 
02 

wdw
de
 .                                                  (A18) 
 
Meanwhile, from (A17), 0e  if and only if  
 
01  

w
, 
 
namely 
 
1
w
 .                                                   (A19) 
 
So, clearly, if w , we have 0e . Meanwhile, from (A17) 
 
02 
  w
w
d
de . 
 
Case 2: (16) holds with strict inequality  
 
In this case, from (16), we have 0l . 
Then, from (14), (15), and (8), we can get  
 
)(  wwx 
 .                                           (A20) 
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And 
 
w
wws 


 
 .                                            (A21) 
 
So, when 0l , we have 
 


 









 1
11
ww
wwe 






 .                (A22) 
From (A22), 0e  if w . And, if w , we have 
 
02 




 wdw
de

 ,                                          (A23) 
 
02 




 w
w
d
de


 .                                          (A24) 
￭ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
 
(1) From Lemma 1 and its proof, we can see that if   , then child labor exists 
if and only if  
 



  1
),min(
1
. 
 
And, if   , then child labor exists if and only if  
 



  1
),min(
1
. 
 
Thus, child labor exists if and only if 
 

  1
),min( . 
 
(2) From (A5), we have  
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012  d
de . 
 
From (A9), we have 
 
0
)1(2
 

 nnd
de . 
 
Thus, child labor increases with   if it exists. 
(3) From (A5) and (A9), we know  
 
0
dw
de . ￭ 
 
Proof of Corollary1: It’s obvious from Part 1 of Proposition 1 and Part 1 of 
Proposition 2. ￭ 
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